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Justice Rehnquist and Constitutional
Interpretationt
By

JOHN DENVIR*

American constitutional theory faces a dilemma. The United
States Supreme Court has decided a large number of cases that commentators intuitively feel are "right,"' but that cannot be justified
under the orthodox theory ofjudicial review. Either the Court's behavior or the orthodox theory will have to change. This Article argues that
theory will yield to practice and that a new conception of constitutional
interpretation will emerge.
The first part of this Article describes the orthodox theory of constitutional interpretation, which limits the judicial role to finding the
historical "intent" of the drafters of the constitutional text, 2 and its new
rival, which recognizes a more creative political role for constitutional
interpretation.3 The second part sketches the record of one Justice,
William Rehnquist, in interpreting the Constitution. 4 Justice Rehnquist is an apt choice because he has championed the orthodox theory,
condemning judges who go beyond the constitutional text for legislating their own subjective preferences. 5 He is at once the most outspokenly "apolitical" member of the Court and the Court's most articulate
conservative voice. The third part shows the orthodox theory's failure
to explain Justice Rehnquist's judicial decisions. 6 It also argues that
t
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1. Cases upholding individual freedom of speech are clear examples. See infra text
accompanying notes 19-23.
2. See infra notes 10-15 & accompanying text.
3. See infra notes 30-37 & accompanying text.
4.
5.

See infra notes 38-160 & accompanying text.
See Rehnquist, The Notion of,4 Living Constitution, 54 TEX. L. REV. 693 (1976).

6. See infra notes 161-75 & accompanying text.
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the emerging, hermeneutically-based, constitutional interpretation 7 not
only better explains Justice Rehnquist's decisions, but also reveals the
social ideal immanent in Justice Rehnquist's record.8 Finally, the
fourth part of the Article addresses the question of the legitimacy of the
new constitutional interpretation in a democracy. 9
Two Modes of Constitutional Interpretation
The Orthodox Theory
The orthodox view of judicial review argues "that judges deciding
constitutional issues should confine themselves to enforcing norms that
are stated or clearly implicit in the written constitution."10 This theory,
once known as "strict construction," is currently called "interpretivism." I Although the name is new, the theory is not; its jurisprudential
roots go back at least to Justice Holmes' famous dissent in Lochner v.
New York ,12 which castigated the majority for reading its own economic preferences into the fourteenth amendment. 13 The orthodox
model is premised on two positivist tenets: that law is objectively determinable and that law is logically separate from moral values that are
arbitrary and subjective. 14 Judges who depart from the constitutional
text (expanded by its history and structure) cease being judges and become, in Justice Rehnquist's words, a
small group of fortunately situated people with a roving commission
to second-guess Congress, state legislatures, and state and federal administrative officers concerning what is best for the country ...
.. Beyond the Constitution and the laws in our society, there
simply is no basis other than the individual conscience of the citizen
that may serve as a platform for the launching of moral judgments.
There is no conceivable way in which I can logically demonstrate to
you that the judgments of my conscience are superior to the judgments of your conscience, and vice versa. Many of us necessarily feel
strongly and deeply about our own moral judgments, but they remain only personal moral judgments until in some way given the
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

See infra text accompanying note 30.
See infra notes 176-249 & accompanying text.
See infra notes 250-60 & accompanying text.
J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 1 (1980).
"Interpretivism" is examined in detail in M.

COURTS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS:

PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION,

THE

AN INQUIRY INTO THE LEGITIMACY OF CONSTITUTIONAL

POLICYMAKING BY THE JUDICIARY

(1982).

12. 198 U.S. 45, 74 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
13. Id. at 75.
14. See R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 14-22 (1978).
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sanction of law.1 5

A judge who departs from the text and instead bases his or her decisions on what he or she thinks is right is necessarily deciding on the

basis of bare personal moral judgments which merely reflect that particular judge's values. Because there is no objective morality on which
to base judgments on questions of value, such judgments are better left
to the legislator who, while no wiser than the judge, is at least more
democratically accountable. 16

This text-oriented model did not appear to have any obvious political bias so long as there was still a controversy about the history of the
first and fourteenth amendments. For instance, Justice Hugo Black

was an "interpretivist"' 7 (then called "strict constructionist") and believed both that the first amendment provided broad protections to

freedom of expression t8 and that the fourteenth amendment "incorporated" the Bill of Rights.' 9 His interpretation of these amendments led
to the conclusion that the Constitution gave very broad protections to

individual rights. Historians, however, have since chipped away both
at the "incorporation" thesis20 and at attempts to give a libertarian content to the first amendment. 2 ' Now it is fairly clear that the framers of
the first amendment did not intend the civil libertarian content that the
15. Rehnquist, supra note 5, at 698, 704.
16. If ... a society adopts a constitution and incorporates in that constitution
safeguards for individual liberty, these safeguards indeed do take on a generalized
moral rightness or goodness. They assume a general social acceptance neither because of any intrinsic worth nor because of any unique origins in someone's idea of
natural justice but instead simply because they have been incorporated in a constitution by the people. Within the limits of our Constitution, the representatives of
the people in the executive branches of the state and national governments enact
laws. The laws that emerge after a typical political struggle in which various individual value judgments are debated likewise take on a form of moral goodness
because they have been enacted into positive law. It is the fact of their enactment
that gives them whatever moral claim they have upon us as a society, however, and
not any independent virtue they may have in any particular citizen's own scale of
values.
Id.at 704.
17. See, e.g., Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 70-73 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting)
(refusal to apply fifth amendment to the states represents unexplained departure from
Supreme Court's uniformly strict constructionist practice); see also J. ELY, supra note 10, at
2.
18. See Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252,265 (1941) ("the only conclusion supported
by history is that the unqualified prohibitions laid down by the framers were intended to
give to liberty of the press, as to the other liberties, the broadest scope that could be countenanced in an orderly society").
19. See Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 89-92 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting).
20. See generally R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION
OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1977).
21. See generally L. LEVY, LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION (1960).
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Supreme Court read into the first amendment in the twentieth century,
and that the framers of the fourteenth amendment had no intent other
than to outlaw the most egregious forms of official race discrimination. 22 Therefore, a fair application of the orthodox theory would now
give a very narrow protection to individual rights, endangering many
decisions that commentators of all political persuasions find commend23
able on substantive political grounds.
Dissatisfaction with orthodox theory is not, however, limited to its
unpopular results; criticism of the theory itself is increasing. There is a
growing uneasiness with the fact/value distinction which is the linchpin
of the orthodox analysis.24 On the one hand, philosophers are less sure
of the "objectivity" of factual descriptions. 25 Any description presupposes a language, and any language necessarily selects aspects of reality
and in so doing distorts it.26 There is a corresponding distrust of the
characterization of all moral values as subjective because this conflicts
with our "persistent, ineluctable tendency to project normative judgments outward and treat them as objectively valid. . . . [W]e assume
a background order within which events come to pass, and that the just
27
is consistent with it and the unjust inconsistent.
The positivist conception of law is beginning to yield to a view of
the law as a normative system bridging the gap between fact and
value. 28 Legal rights are no longer seen as part of a closed system of
determinable fact, but as a system of "open-ended, transcendent, undetermined" principles incapable of being fully known.2 9 The theory of
constitutional interpretation described in the following section is consistent with this new view of the nature of law.
22. R. BERGER, supra note 20, at 205.
23. See generally Grey, Do We Hae an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REv. 703
(1975).
24. See supra text accompanying note 14; see also R. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS (1975); Dworkin, Law as Interpretation, 9 CRITICAL INQUIRY 179 (1982).
25. "Each interpretation of a fact is really always the interpretation of an earlier interpretation disguised as plain positive fact." V. DESCOMBES, MODERN FRENCH PHILOSOPHY
116 (1980). See also A. MCINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE (1981); Taylor, Understandingin Human
Science, 34 REV. OF METAPHYSICS 25 (1980).
26. See K. BURKE, LANGUAGE AS SYMBOLIC ACTION 45 (1966) ("any nomenclature
necessarily directs the attention into some channels rather than others").
27. Weinreb, Law as Order, 92 HARV. L. REV. 909, 955 (1978).
28. See, e.g., Selznick, Sociology and Natural Law, 6 NAT. L. FORUM 84, 90 (1961).
29. Fletcher, Two Modes of Legal Thought, 90 YALE L.J. 970, 981-82 (1981). Paul
Ricoeur points out that language often has a double meaning; it is equivocal. Interpretation
concerns the meaning of equivocal expressions. "To interpret is to understand a double
meaning." P. RICOEUR, FREUD AND PHILOSOPHY: AN ESSAY ON INTERPRETATION 8
(1970).
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The New Interpretation
Hermeneutics is a model for the emerging approach described in
this Article. Hermeneutics
sees knowledge as pragmatically relative to contexts of understanding. The paradigm of the phenomenon of understanding is the interpretation of texts, and hermeneutical theory maintains that while
there are no reductionist facts of the matter to be properly or improperly represented by interpretation, nevertheless there are determinate
on what gets taken as proper or improper
constraints 30
interpretation.
The hermeneutical insight that there is no one proper interpretation of a text has been applied to constitutional law by Professors Owen
Fiss and Ronald Dworkin. Professor Fiss argues that interpretation is
neither "a wholly discretionary or wholly mechanical activity," but
rather a "dynamic interaction between reader and text, and meaning
the product of that interaction."'3 ' Professor Dworkin rejects the positivist "distinction between description and evaluation. . . because in-

terpretation is something different from both

....

"32

A judge's

interpretation of a text "will include both structural features, elaborating the general requirement that an interpretation must fit doctrinal
history, and substantive claims about social goals and principles of justice. Any judge's opinion about the best interpretation will therefore be
'33
the consequence of beliefs other judges need not share.
In constitutional law, such interpretations will be controversial because the normative theories they reflect are controversial. Professor
Dworkin points out that any interpretation of the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment will be dependent on some theory
of political equality; such reliance is necessary to interpretation.3 4 And
any such theory will be an ideal as well as a description; "the choices
theory must make are choices among conceptions of what society ought
30. Hoy, Hermeneutics, 47 Soc. RESEARCH 649, 657 (1980). See also K. BURKE, A
GRAMMAR OF MOTrIVs 323-401 (1945); Graff, 'Keep off the Grass,' 'Drop Dead 'and Other
Indeterminacies: A Response to Sanford Levinson, 60 Tax. L. REv. 405 (1982).
31. Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation,34 STAN. L. REV. 739, 739 (1982).
32. Dworkin, supra note 24, at 196.
33. Id Hermeneutics stresses that any such interpretive understanding "is laden with
" Hoy, supra note 30, at 658. "Understandings
self-understanding, however implicit ..
are inseparable from values: our vision of the world conditions the ends we hold and our
most general forms of consciousness combine ideas and ideals into a single system of beliefs." R. UNGER, LAW IN MODERN SocIETY 258 (1976). Clifford Geertz contends it is
"through the construction of [such] schematic images of social order, that man makes himself a political animal." C. GEERTZ, THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES 218 (1973).

34.

Dworkin, supra note 24, at 199.
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to be as well as among views of what it is. '' 35 In a nation divided on the
issue of what is a just society, conflicting constitutional interpretations
are inevitable.
Because constitutional interpretation requires that meaning be
given to concepts such as "equality," for which there are no objective
meanings, such interpretation can never be objective in the sense the
traditional theory demands. However, interpretation need not be arbitrary. There are constraints on arbitrariness in any discourse. For example, one constraint internal to legal discourse is "a commitment to
the search for truth, to consistency of thought, and to logical analysis of
evidence ....
-36 Professor Dworkin argues that judges are always
constrained by the internal ideal of law, "the challenge of making the
standards that govern our collective lives articulate, coherent, and
37
effective."
Before applying the principles of hermeneutics to explain the decisions of Justice Rehnquist, we must examine his record in light of the
traditional concepts of judicial activism and judicial restraint.
Justice Rehnquist on the Text
The crucial question in constitutional adjudication is whether the
court will find that the Constitution has been violated. Judicial "activism" means an expansive reading of the text so as to find violations;
judicial "restraint" means a narrow reading of the text in order to avoid
judicial intervention. This section examines Justice Rehnquist's record
as a judge to determine where he has practiced restraint and where he
has been an activist. 38
Judicial Restraint
Standing

Before a statute can be ruled unconstitutional, some party must be
found to have standing to challenge it. That is, some party must assert
35. R. UNGER, supra note 33, at 267.
36. Selznick, supra note 28, at 97. See also Dworkin, No Right Answer? 53 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1 (1978).
37. Dworkin, "Natural"Law Revisited, 34 U. FLA. L. REV. 165, 187 (1982). See also
Denvir,ProfessorDworkin andAn Activist Theory of ConstitutionalAdjudicaion,45 ALBANY
L. REV. 13 (1980) (outlining a theory of constitutional adjudication that significantly limits
judicial discretion).
38. In the following summary I rely on Justice Rehnquist's own opinions and the hold-

ings of cases m which he joined the majority or plurality opinion. While I make no claim
that my search has exhausted the sources, I do believe this summary to be a fair representation of Justice Rehnquist's work on the Court.
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that the statute violates his or her constitutional rights sufficiently to
constitute a "case or controversy." 39 A negative vote on standing is in
effect a vote to allow the challenged legislation to stand. Justice Rehnquist has consistently construed the article III phrase "cases and controversies" narrowly, thereby voting to restrict constitutional challenges

to legislation. 40
State Action

The fourteenth amendment protects individuals from abridgment
41
or deprivation by the states of rights granted in the amendment.
Therefore, no violation of this amendment can be found unless the
Court determines there is "state action" involved in the alleged violation. In the three decades before Justice Rehnquist's appointment, the
Court had expanded "state action" to include acts of private parties
performing "public functions" 4 2 and acts of private parties in which
'43
there has been some "state involvement.
Justice Rehnquist has been the Burger Court's primary spokesper39. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962).
40. See Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 122 (1976) (Powell, J., dissenting in part and
concurring in part); Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26 (1976) (indigents
who had been denied hospital services had no standing to challenge extension by I.R.S. of
favorable tax treatment to hospitals that did not serve indigents to extent hospitals were
financially able); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975) (plaintiff who seeks to challenge exclusionary zoning practices must allege specific, concrete facts demonstrating that the challenged practices harm him, and that he personally would benefit in a tangible way from the
court's intervention); United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures
(SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669, 722 (1973) (White, J.,dissenting in part). Justice Rehnquist did
vote to find a justiciable case and controversy in Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous.
Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977) (individual moving into a specific proposed housing project had
standing to challenge on grounds of racial discrimination because of city's refusal to rezone
to allow the project), and Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205 (1972)
(interpreting § 810(a) of Civil Rights Act of 1968 as giving standing to any person who
claims injury by discriminatory housing practices, not just those persons who are objects of
such practices).
41. "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
42. E.g., Amalgamated Food Employees Union v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S.
308 (1968) (shopping center open to the public was functional equivalent of a business district and was subject to first amendment); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946) (privatelyowned town was subject to constraints of first and fourteenth amendments because opera-,
tion of a town is a public function).
43. E.g., Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961) (privately operated
restaurant was subject to fourteenth amendment because public ownership and maintenance
of its building constituted state involvement).
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son in a series of cases severely constricting the state action concept. 44
In Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co. ,45 Justice Rehnquist limited the
"public function" line of cases to situations in which the private actor is
performing a function "traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the
state,"' 46 a phrase he has interpreted narrowly.
The "state involvement" line of cases has also been severely narrowed. In Jackson, Justice Rehnquist 47 limited state involvement to
situations in which "there is a sufficiently close nexus between the State
and the challenged action of the [private party] so that the action of the
latter may be fairly treated as that of the State itself.' 48 Under this
theory, state involvement may well be sufficient only when the state is a
joint participant in the challenged action 4 9 or compels the private
action.50
51
ProceduralDue Process

One area of constitutional expansion in the late 1960's and early
1970's concerned the application of the due process clause require44. Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978) (state code provision allowing selfhelp sale by warehousemen did not make such a sale state action); Jackson v. Metropolitan
Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974) (termination of service by a privately owned utility was not
state action even though such termination was permitted by utility's general tariff filed with
state utility commission); Moose Lodge v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972) (issuance of liquor license to private club having discriminatory guest practices did not make those practices state
action).
45. 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
46. 1d. at 353.
47. Joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart, White, Blackmun, and Powell.
48. Id. at 351.
49. See Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
50. See Moose Lodge v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 177-79 (1972). In his early years on the
Court, Justice Rehnquist had joined majorities embracing a more expansive concept of state
involvement, e.g., Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455 (1973), but in recent cases he has
restrictively interpreted those cases. For instance, in Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S.
149 (1978), Justice Rehnquist refers to Norwood as a case involving the remedial powers of a
federal court remedying prior de jure race discrimination. Id. at 163.
51. This section examines only civil cases. I have not examined in detail Justice
Rehnquist's votes in cases involving criminal procedure. It does appear, however, that
Justice Rehnquist has generally voted to uphold state criminal procedures against
constitutional attack. See, e.g., Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978) (petitioner who had no
legitimate expectation of privacy in areas searched had no standing to challenge the search);
Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1949) (failure to afford full Miranda safeguards did not
result in deprivation of privilege against self-incrimination); Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S.
458 (1973) (retrial proper where mistrial granted after attachment of double jeopardy). But
see Burch v. Louisiana, 441 U.S. 130 (1979) (nonunanimous, six-member jury conviction
held deprivation of right to jury trial for non-petty offenses): Ham v. South Carolina. 409
U.S. 524 (1973) (due process violation where judge refused to make inquiry of racial bias of
prospective jurors).
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52
ments of notice and an adversary hearing in diverse civil contexts.
Justice Rehnquist has expressed a "philosophical skepticism about the
desirability of adversary proceedings in a number of situations, '53 and
his decisions are consistent with this view.
There are two central questions in procedural due process analysis.
First, has there been the deprivation of a "property" or "liberty" interest that triggers the requirement of due process? 54 Second, if so, what
process is "due"? 55 On both questions, Justice Rehnquist has consist-

ently given answers narrowing the individual's right.
On the question of what constitutes "property" or "liberty" for
purposes of the fourteenth amendment, Justice Rehnquist has stated
that these terms only attain "constitutional status by virtue of the fact

that they have been initially recognized and protected by state law
...

."56

Therefore, when state law creates a property or liberty inter-

est, it can define or delimit the interest by conditioning its creation on
57

reduced due process protections. For example, in Arnett v. Kennedy,

Justice Rehnquist argued that the only "property" an individual had in
a government job was the "entitlement" created by the government,
and there was no reason why the government could not define the entitlement to include only those procedural protections it wished to
grant.5 8 This logic would permit the state to completely elude due process requirements if it took the time to draft statutes and contracts
artfully.
When a "property" or "liberty" interest is found to be present, Jus59
tice Rehnquist generally finds the existing state procedures adequate.
52. See, e.g., Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971) (suspension of driver's license and
motor vehicle registration); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (termination of welfare
benefits).
53. Rehnquist, The Adversary Society. Keynote Address of the ThirdAnnual Baron de
Hirsh Meyer Lecture Series, 33 U. MIAMI L. REv. 1, 3 (1978).
54. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
55. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
56. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 710 (1976).
57. 416 U.S. 134 (1974).
58. Id at 155. InArnett, the statute that granted the plaintiff government employee a
right not to be removed except for cause also established the procedures for determining
such cause and expressly omitted further procedural guarantees that might have otherwise
been imposed by the Constitution. Therefore, the employee had a right only to the statutorily limited procedures. Id at 151-54.
59. See, e.g., Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 22 (1978) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (termination of utility service); Board of Curators v. Horowitz, 435 U.S.
78 (1978) (dismissal of student for academic cause); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977)
(imposition of corporal punishment in schools); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976)
(continued receipt of social security disability); North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem,
Inc., 419 U.S. 601, 614 (1975) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (garnishment statute).
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In some of these cases, the procedures were virtually nonexistent. 60
Substantive Due Process

Although "substantive due process" has carried a pejorative connotation since the 1930's,6 1 the Supreme Court has found protection for
a series of individual privacy interests in the liberty component of the
due process clause. 6 2 A political conservative might be expected to be
sympathetic to decisions protecting individuals from government intrusion into important personal decisions. In fact, Justice Rehnquist has
consistently voted against individuals claiming constitutional privacy
rights. 63 He admits that "liberty" interests are involved in such cases.
Liberty, however, "is not guaranteed absolutely against deprivation,
but only against deprivation without due process of law. The test traditionally applied in the area of social and economic legislation is
whether or not a law such as that challenged has a rational relation to a
valid state objective." 64 This use of the deferential "rational basis"
65
scrutiny results in a rubber stamp of approval in fact if not in theory.
60. See, e.g., Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 22 (1978) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (dissent argued that municipal utility's notice that service would be disconnected if bill was not paid need not inform customers of availability of procedures for
protesting proposed termination); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977) (child's interest
in personal security was adequately protected from excessive corporal punishment by requirement that teacher consult principal before punishing child and subsequent imposition
of civil liability if punishment is found to have been excessive).
61. See Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730 (1963) ("The doctrine that . . .due
process authorizes courts to hold laws unconstitutional when they believe the legislature has
acted unwisely. . . has long since been discarded. We have returned to the original constitutional proposition that courts do not substitute their social and economic beliefs for the
...
); see also West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S.
judgment of legislative bodies.
379 (1937).
62. See, e.g., Carey v. Population Serv. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (nonprescription contraceptives); Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (family living arrangements); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (abortion).
63. See, e.g., Carey v. Population Serv. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 717 (1977) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) (restrictions on nonprescription contraceptives are legitimate use of state police
power); Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 531 (1977) (Stewart, J., dissenting)
(no protected right to family living arrangements); Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238 (1976)
(no violation of right by limiting length of policeman's hair); Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton,
413 U.S. 49 (1973) (no privacy right to exhibit obscene material in place of public accommodation); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 171 (1973) (Rehnquist, J.,dissenting) (no privacy right
to abortion).
64. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 173 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
65. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16-3 (1978); see also Williamson
v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955) ("It is enough that there is an evil at hand for
correction, and that it might be thought that the particular legislative measure was a rational
way to correct it.").

May/July 19831

CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION

EqualProtection

Since the middle of the twentieth century, the Supreme Court has
interpreted the equal protection clause to require more than just a "rational basis" to support legislation in two types of cases: those involving "suspect classifications" 66 and those affecting "fundamental
interests. ' 67 Legislation that is found to be within one of these categories is subject to strict judicial scrutiny and must be supported by a
"compelling state interest" to be sustained.68 Race 69 and alienage70
have been treated as suspect classifications. Fundamental interests include the right to vote, 7 ' the interests in marriage and family, 72 and the
73
right to travel.
Except in cases involving classifications based on race,7 4 Justice
Rehnquist applies the "rational basis" test to legislation challenged
under the equal protection clause.7 5 He has criticized the Court's use of
the clause to apply greater scrutiny in areas other than race
discrimination:
Except in the area of the law in which the framers obviously meant
[the Clause] to apply---classifications based on race or on national
origin, the first cousin of race-the Court's decisions can be fairly
described as an endless tinkering with legislative judgments, a series
of conclusions unsupported by any central guiding principle.7 6
66. See generally L. TRIBE, supra note 65, §§ 16-13 to -17.
67. See generally id. §§ 16-7 to -12.
68. See infra notes 69-73.
69. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214
(1944).
70. See Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1 (1977); Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n,
334 U.S. 410 (1948).
71. See Hill v. Stone, 421 U.S. 289 (1975); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S.
663 (1966).
72. See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535
(1942).
73. See Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974); Dunn v. Blumstein,
405 U.S. 330 (1972); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
74. See Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 780 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). In
reviewing laws based on racial classification, Justice Rehnquist does not treat cases of "benign" discrimination differently from cases involving discrimination against racial minorities. See, e.g., Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 523-26 (1980) (Stewart, J., dissenting)
(rejecting minority business affirmative action program as racially discriminatory).
75. See Illinois State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173, 190
(1979) (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (no rational basis for requiring a greater number of signatures to qualify a local candidate to appear on the ballot than to qualify a statewide candidate). Justice Rehnquist pointed out that the irrationality of the legislation was due to
earlier decisions of the Court that had knocked out key provisions in the law, and that the
appellant Board of Elections had made little effort even to justify the law to the Court under
the rational basis test. Id at 190-91. See also infra notes 76-78.
76. Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 777 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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Accordingly, he disagrees with the Court's activist approach in scrutinizing classifications based on alienage,77 sex 78 or illegitimacy, 79 or
which impinge upon "fundamental rights" such as the right to vote 80 or
travel. 8 '
Despite Justice Rehnquist's acceptance of the principle that race
classifications are permissible only if they are a necessary means of advancing compelling state interests, he has normally ruled against civil
rights claimants.8 2 This seemingly incongruous result is reached by his
application of a restrictive test to determine if "discriminatory intent"
is present, 83 and by narrow concepts of causation 84 and remedy 5 once
a violation has been established.
Free Speech

Three philosophical principles are immanent in Justice Rehnquist's free speech decisions. First, he accepts a "utilitarian" rather
than a "human rights" justification for free speech; it is the need for an
informed electorate in a democracy that the first amendment protects
77. E.g., Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 649 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (law
limiting civil service jobs to citizens passes rational basis test).
78. E.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 217 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (law allowing women to drink at younger age than men passes rational basis test). In Craig, the
Court applied an intermediate standard of review: "Classifications by gender must serve
important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of
those objectives." Id at 197.
79. E., Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 777 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (state
inheritance statute discriminating against illegitimate children not "patently irrational").
Although the Court held that illegitimacy is not a suspect classification, it scrutinized the
statute to a greater degree than normally required under the rational basis test. Id at 76667.
80. Eg., Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51, 65 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (law
prohibiting switching parties after primary does not impermissibly burden a voter's freedom
of association).
81. Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 277 (1974) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (state residence requirement for medical care not arbitrary).
82. See infra notes 83-85. A memo he had prepared as a law clerk for Justice Jackson
caused many to doubt at his confirmation hearings whether William Rehnquist in fact supported the decision in Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). He responded that the
anti-Brown memo was meant to set out Justice Jackson's views, not his own, and that he, at
the time of the hearings, fully supported the Brown decision. R. KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE
605-10 (1976).
83. See Memphis v. Greene, 415 U.S. 100 (1981) (Stevens, J.); Arlington Heights v.
Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977) (Powell, J.); Washington v. Davis, 426
U.S. 229 (1976) (White, J.).
84. Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 489 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526, 542 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
85. E.g., Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424 (1976); Milliken v.
Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
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rather than any individual speaker's "claim to be master of his or her
own personal development. '8 6 Second, he believes, in accord with his
first principle, that the full force of first amendment protections comes
into play only when "the government attempts to regulate speech of
those expressing views on public issues."'8 7 Finally, he believes that the
first amendment limits are incorporated by the fourteenth amendment
in only an attenuated form.88 The result of these principles is a decided
preference for judicial restraint in free speech cases. 89
Justice Rehnquist grants no first amendment protection to obscenity90 and has consistently upheld state power to regulate "offensive
speech." 9 ' He insists on the states' right to regulate the "public forum" 92 and has consistently voted to limit the situations to which the
"public forum" concept applies. 9 3 Justice Rehnquist has also been un94
willing to protect so-called "symbolic" speech.
86. Rehnquist, The FirstAmendment: Freedom, Philosophy, and the Law, 12 GONZ. L.
Rnv. 1, 6 (1976).
87. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 595
(1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
88. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 291 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
89. Justice Rehnquist has upheld free speech claims in a few cases; all of these cases
were decided without dissent and therefore may be considered "easy" cases. See, e.g., Citizens Against Rent Control/Coalition for Fair Hous. v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 300
(1982) (Rehnquist, J., concurring); Givahan v. Western Consolidated School Dist., 439 U.S.
410 (1979); Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829 (1978) (state criminal
law prohibiting publication ofjudicial review commission violated first amendment); Abood
v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (mandatory public
employee union dues used for political purposes violated employees' freedom of association); Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976) (trial judge's prohibition against
publishing implicating facts from criminal trial held invalid as a prior restraint); Miami
Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (state "right of reply" law giving
political candidates newspaper space to answer criticism violated freedom of the press); Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153 (1974) (film within first amendment protections because not
patently offensive and thus not obscene).
90. E.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973) (Burger, C.J.) (defining obscenity
and reaffirming that it is not protected by the first amendment). But cf. Jenkins v. Georgia,
418 U.S. 153 (1974) (Rehnquist, J.) (holding that the film CarnalKnowledge was not obscene
as a matter of law since it was not patently offensive and was therefore within first amendment protections).
91. See, e.g., Federal Communications Comm'n v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726
(1978); Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
92. E.g., Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620, 639 (1980)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (localities should be free to prohibit door-to-door solicitation for
money).
93. See, e.g., Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976) (Stewart, J.) (military base is not a
public forum); Lehman v. Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974) (Blackmun, J.) (advertising
space on a city transit system is not a first amendment forum).
94. Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 416 (1974) (Relmquist, J., dissenting).
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Justice Rehnquist has been unsympathetic to claims by the press
for first amendment protection. He has affirmed the right of states to
grant remedies for defamation 95 and has denied a press claim for first
96
amendment protection from a warrant to search a newspaper office.
He also denies any constitutional right of press access to government97
controlled information.
The free speech cases give some credibility to Justice Rehnquist's
claim of "neutrality" in constitutional adjudication 9 8 because sometimes he has reached results that seem at odds with conservative ideology. Notably, he is the sole member of the Court not to grant any first
amendment protection to commercial speech. 99 He voted to uphold the
rights of a state to silence corporations in referendum elections, 100 and
of a public utilities commission to censor the pronuclear power
messages a public utility enclosed with its bills to customers. 0 1 He also
has ruled, in an opinion for the Court, that a property owner has no
first amendment right to close off his property to free speech activities
10 2
that the state says must be allowed.
The Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses

Justice Rehnquist has urged the Court to give a narrow scope to
both the establishment clause and the free exercise clause 10 3 of the first
amendment, thereby extending a good deal of discretion to legislatures
in this area. 104 "By broadly construing both clauses, the Court has constantly narrowed the channel between the Scylla and Charybdis
through which any state or federal action must pass in order to survive
constitutional scrutiny."' 0 5 He does not view the establishment clause
95.

See, e.g., Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 461-64 (1976) (publishers are liable

for defamation of private individuals where injury and fault proven).
96.

Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978) (White, J.).

97.

Houchins v. KQED, 438 U.S. 1, 15 (1978); Richmond Newspaper Inc. v. Virginia,

448 U.S. 555, 604 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974).
98. See supra text accompanying note 15.

99. E.g., Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 583
(1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 787-90 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
100. First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 822 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
101. Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 555 (1980) (Black-

mun, J., dissenting).
102.

PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 88 (1980).

103.

"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting

the free exercise thereof." U.S. CONST. amend. 1.

104.

Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707. 720-27

(1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
105. Id at 721.
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as a major bar to state aid to religious education10 6 and is hostile to
most claims that a law interferes with the claimant's free exercise of
religion, 0 7 agreeing with Justice Harlan's comment that "those situations in which the Constitution may require special treatment on account of religion are. . . few and far between."10
"Dormant" Commerce Clause

The Supreme Court traditionally has interpreted the Commerce
Power in its "dormant" state-when Congress has not exercised its
power to regulate-to be a bar to protectionist state legislation. 10 9 Because the Court's decisions in this area are premised on the free trade

principles, one might expect Justice Rehnquist to support this "activist"
initiative. In fact, with few exceptions," 0 he has voted to uphold state
regulation of interstate commerce, and contends that the "State must

simply prove, aided by a 'strong presumption of validity,' that the...
106. See, e.g., Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646
(1980) (White, J.)(upholding law that reimbursed religious and secular private schools for
services required by state); Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 255 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting in part) (upholding portion of Ohio statute authorizing state to provide nonpublic
school pupils with books, standardized testing and scoring, diagnostic services, and therapeutic and remedial services); Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 767 (1976)
(White, J., concurring in judgment) (no establishment clause violation where there is a secular legislative purpose and primary effect of legislation neither advances nor inhibits religion); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 387 (1975) (Rehnquist, J.,dissenting) (lending
textbooks to private schools does not violate establishment clause); Levitt v. Committee for
Pub. Educ., 413 U.S. 472, 481 (1973) (Burger, C.J.) (striking down state law reimbursing
private schools for performing services required by state).
107. Thomas v. Review Bd.of the Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707 (1981). See
also Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361 (1974). But f McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618 (1978)
(Burger, C.J.) (statute prohibiting clergy from participation in constitutional conventions
violates free exercise clause).
108. See Thomas v. Review Bd.of the Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 723
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
109. See, e.g., Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520 (1959) (rear fender mudguard regulation held to burden interstate commerce unreasonably); H.P. Hood & Sons v.
Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525 (1949) (state's denial of interstate milk distribution license to protect
local market unconstitutional); Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945) (state
interest in train length safety regulation outweighed by national interest in uniform transportation system); Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511 (1935) (regulation prohibiting sale of out-of-state milk that didn't meet minimum price scale imposes unconstitutional
burden on commerce). In all of these cases, the Court invalidated under the commerce
clause state laws that discriminated against interstate commerce, even though Congress had
not exercised its power to regulate the subject of the state law-hence the term "dormant"
commerce power.
110. See, e.g., Lewis v. BT Investment Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27 (1980) (Blackmun, J.)
(invalidating law prohibiting out-of-state banks from owning investment advice companies);
Great At. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366 (1976) (Brennan, J.)(mandatory reciprocity agreement from other states to distribute milk held invalid).
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benefits of the law are not illusory." I"'
Requiring only that a state have some substantial interest in regulating the subject matter, Justice Rehnquist has sometimes voted to al2
low states to apparently discriminate against interstate commerce," 1
and has even voted to exempt South Dakota's experiment in socialism
(a state-owned cement plant) from the restraints of the dormant commerce clause. 1 3 He also voted to uphold a Maryland statute which
4
appeared to reflect local animus against multinational oil companies."
Cruel and Unusual Punishments

Justice Rehnquist consistently has voted against claims based on
the cruel and unusual punishments clause of the eighth amendment.
Some of these cases have involved the death penalty.1 5 Another case
6
upheld the constitutionality of a harsh recidivism statute."
Judicial Intervention
To this point, Justice Rehnquist's record might be characterized as
judicial restraint with a vengeance; he even upholds legislation which
he may abhor on policy grounds. However, the foregoing reflects only
a portion of his record. Justice Rehnquist has in fact been an "activist"
in several areas of constitutional law.
The "Takings" Clause

The fifth amendment states that "private property" shall not "be
I11. Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 673, 697 n.8 (1981) (citation
omitted) (Rehnquist, J.,dissenting). See White v. Massachusetts Council of Constr. Employers, Inc., 103 S. Ct. 1042 (1983); see also infra notes 112-14.
112. Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 339 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 629 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
113. Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429 (1980) (Blackmun, J.).
114. Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Md., 437 U.S. 117 (1978). Justice Rehnquist has made
little use of the "preemption" doctrine under the supremacy clause to limit state autonomy.
See, e.g., Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 180 (1978) (Marshall, Brennan, Rehnquist, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (tanker size regulation not preempted by
federal law as Secretary of Transportation merely authorized, not required, to issue regulations in this area).
115. E.g., Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 604 (1977) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (cruel
and unusual punishments clause doesn't prohibit imposing death penalty for rape): Gregg v.
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 207 (1976) (White, J.,concurring) (death penalty proper for aggravated murder).
116. Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980) (Rehnquist, 3.) (upholding recidivism statute that imposed mandatory life sentence upon third felony conviction, as applied to defendant who had obtained a total of $229.11 during course of three felonies).
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taken for public use without just compensation."' 1 7 Justice Rehnquist
has given the clause an activist interpretation. For instance, dissenting
in Penn Central TransportationCo. v. New York City," 8 he argued for
an expansive definition of both the terms "property" and "taking."' " 9
The "Contract" Clause
The Burger Court has rediscovered the "contracts clause,"' 20 another constitutional text which had fallen into disuse. Cases have involved the amendment of a law regulating the state's own debts,' 2 ' and
the retroactive application of a law to a contract between private par-

ties.' 22 In both situations, Justice Rehnquist found an unconstitutional
"impairment" of contracts.
The Tenth Amendment
Justice Rehnquist gave an activist, expansive reading to the tenth
amendment 23 in the landmark case of National League of Cities v.
Usery, 124 in which he interpreted the amendment as a bar to Congressional regulation of the "States as States."'125 In FederalEnergy Regula117. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
118. 438 U.S. 104, 138 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
119. Id at 138. See also Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979) and Webb's
Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155 (1980), in which "takings" arguments
were upheld. But also note that Justice Rehnquist wrote the majority opinion rejecting a
"takings" argument in PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980), and
joined the majority in rejecting a "takings" argument in Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S.
255 (1980).
120. "No State shall . . . pass any . . . Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts
U.S. COrsT. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
....
121. United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1 (1977) (Blackmun, J.) (repeal of
a statutory covenant that had limited the Port Authority's ability to use revenues pledged as
security for bonds issued by Port Authority violated the contract clause).
122. Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234 (1978) (Stewart, J.) (retroactive application of law that modified the funding required of an employer to his pension
trust fund under his private agreement with his employees violated the contract clause).
123. "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited
by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." U.S. CONST.
amend. X.
124. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
125. Id at 845. The Usery Court held that the application of federal minimum wage
and maximum hour provisions to employees of state and local governments was unconstitutional to the extent the provisions operated "to directly displace the States' freedom to structure integral operations in areas of traditional governmental functions .... ." Id at 852.
Justice Rehnquist has not attempted to apply the tenth amendment to federal regulation of
private parties. See Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264,
307 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (federal coal mining regulation did not violate tenth
amendment).
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tory Commission v. Mississipi,126 he joined Justice O'Connor's dissent,
which criticized the majority for upholding a federal statute against a
tenth amendment claim. Justice O'Connor asserted that the legislation,
which directed states to consider the adoption of specific utility regulatory standards and prescribed the procedures to be followed during the
consideration process, permitted Congress to "conscript" state agencies
"into the national bureaucratic army."'' 7 The dissenters viewed this
structuring of a state agency's regulatory agenda as regulation of
28
"States as States."'
The Eleventh Amendment
29
Justice Rehnquist has also revitalized the eleventh amendment,1
giving it meaning well beyond a strict reading of the text. Historically,
it has been constitutionally permissible to bring a suit in federal court
against a state official to enjoin the enforcement of an unconstitutional
state statute or to command compliance with federal laws,' 30 even
though the probable effect of the decree is the increased expenditure of
funds from the state treasury.' 3' This indirect impact on the state itself
does not bring these suits within the eleventh amendment's prohibition
of federal jurisdiction of suits against states.
Justice Rehnquist sharply limited this means of invoking federal
jurisdiction to remedy state violations in Edelman v. Jordan. 32 In that
case, he held that the eleventh amendment constituted a bar to a federal court decree enjoining state officials from withholding benefits
which had been wrongly withheld in the past. 33 Justice Rehnquist
found that the eleventh amendment precluded such a retroactive award
of monetary relief, and held that the decree could enjoin only prospective conduct of state officials.' 34 He attempted to extend Edelman in
126. 456 U.S. 742, 775 (1982) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
127. Id. at 775-77.
128. Id. at 777.
129. "The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any
suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens
of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
130. See Exparte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908); see also Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S.
365 (1971); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618
(1969).
131. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 667-68 (1974).
132. 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
133. Id. at 653-56. State officials had failed to meet federal time limits for processing
applications for government assistance, and had failed to make payments for the period
during which the applicants would have been eligible had the officials acted within the prescribed time guidelines. Id at 653-54.
134. Id. at 667-69. Justice Rehnquist acknowledged that the Court had affirmed such
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Hutto v. Finney, 35 arguing that an award of attorneys' fees in a section
1983 action against state officials was a retroactive penalty barred by
37
the eleventh amendment, 36 but the majority failed to go along.'
Equal Protection

Perhaps the most highly publicized issue during Justice Rehnquist's tenure on the Court has been the constitutionality of so-called
"benign discrimination": race-conscious remedies for prior societal
discrimination. Despite his record of restraint on most equal protection
issues, 38 Justice Rehnquist believes benign discrimination violates the
Constitution. 39 He has also voted against race-conscious remedies on
40
statutory grounds, not reaching the constitutional question.'
The Appointments Clause

The appointments clause' 4 ' rarely figures in constitutional litigation. In the one case that has come before the Court during his tenure,
Justice Rehnquist interpreted the clause to be a bar to congressional
legislation. 142 He joined the majority in striking down congressional
involvement in the appointment of members of the Federal Election

Commission as unconstitutional.

43

retroactive payments in the past, but stated that the instant case was "the first opportunity
the Court has taken to fully explore and treat the Eleventh Amendment aspects of such relief
in a written opinion." Id at 670-71.
135. 437 U.S. 678 (1978).
136. Id at 715 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
137. Id at 717-18. Justice Rehnquist concedes that the eleventh amendment is not a bar
to an action authorized by Congress under § 5 of the fourteenth amendment. Fitzpatrick v.
Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976) (Rehnquist, J.). He would, however, limit Fitzpatrick to constitutional violations that are expressly prohibited by the fourteenth amendment and would not
extend it to prohibitions that are only incorporated by the fourteenth amendment. Hutto v.
Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 717 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
138. See supra notes 74-85 & accompanying text.
139. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 523-24 (1980) (Stewart, J., dissenting). Fullilove was decided under the "equal protection" concept included in the fifth amendment due
process clause. See Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
140. E.g., United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 219 (1979) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 408 (1978) (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
141. "[The President] shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the
Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the
supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States. . . . Congress may by Law vest
U.S. CONST. art. II,
the appointment of such Inferior Officers as they think proper.
2.
§ 2, cl.
142. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 109-41 (1976).
143. Id at 132.
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Executive Privilege
Justice Rehnquist infers a constitutional right of executive privi-

lege, not explicit in the text, to support presidential claims for the need
of confidentiality. He argues that the constitutional principle of separation of powers requires that the President have a privilege to keep his
communications confidential.144
Legislative Privilege

Justice Rehnquist reads the speech or debate clause
in a variety of contexts.'

46

45

expansively

For example, in Doe v. McMillan,

47

in

which the Court held that members of Congress are immune from liability for the preparation of a committee report for distribution to Congress, he argued that the immunity should extend to public
48
dissemination as well.'
Delegation of Powers Doctrine

Justice Rehnquist has attempted to reinvigorate the "unlawful delegation of legislative powers" doctrine. The doctrine was a favorite of
the conservative 1930's Court, where it was used to strike down New
Deal legislation.' 4 9 It fell out of favor in the 1940's,1s ° but Justice
Rehnquist has argued that the unlawful delegation doctrine does not
144. Nixon v. Administration of Gen. Serv., 433 U.S. 425, 545 (1977) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting). He did not participate in the "Watergate tapes" case, United States v. Nixon,
418 U.S. 683 (1974).
145. "[F]or any Speech or Debate in either House, [Senators and Representatives] shall
not be questioned in any other Place." U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 6.
146. See, e.g., Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491 (1975) (Burger, C.J.) (issuance of a subpoena by a congressional committee in furtherance of a legitimate congressional investigation is protected by the absolute prohibition of the speech or
debate clause, so it cannot be challenged in court); United States v. Helstoski, 442 U.S. 477
(1979) (Burger. C.J.) (in prosecution of congresswoman on charges of accepting money to
influence her performance of official acts, evidence of legislative acts could not be introduced because purpose of speech or debate clause was to preclude prosecution for official
acts); Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 251 (1979) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (argued for remand to consider whether speech or debate clause precluded suit against member of Congress by a former employee for sex discrimination in employment). But see Hutchinson v.
Proxmire, 443 U.S. III (1979) (Burger, C.J.) (newsletters and press releases of members of
Congress are not protected by the speech or debate clause).
147. 412 U.S. 306 (1973).
148. Id. at 338. (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
149. See, e.g., Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (delegation
to President of authority to approve codes of fair competition upon application of trade and
industrial associations was an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power); Panama Ref
Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935) (delegation to President of transportation regulation powers unconstitutional).
150. E.g., American Power & Light Co. v. Securities & Exch. Comm'n, 329 U.S. 90
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"suffer from. . . the excesses of judicial policy making that plagued
other doctrines of that era."' 5' Accordingly, he argued that congres-

sional occupational safety legislation should be struck down as an un52
lawful delegation.'
The Commerce Power

Since the New Deal, the Court has rarely doubted Congress'
54
power under the commerce clause 153 to regulate private individuals.
While Justice Rehnquist has not voted to strike down congressional
legislation as exceeding the commerce power, he has argued that the

test to be applied for finding commerce power jurisdiction is stricter
than the present Court acknowledges.

55

The Enforcement Clause of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Ffteenth
Amendments

Justice Rehmquist also wishes to limit the power granted to Congress by the civil rights amendments.' 56 In City of Rome . United
States,157 he called the majority's upholding of a provision of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 under the fifteenth amendment's enforcement

clause a "total abdication" of its responsibility to scrutinize congressional legislation to ensure that Congress does not exceed its constitu-

tional powers.

58

He argued that the Court's decision allowed Congress

to decide whether a particular state action violated the Civil War
amendments, and thereby to define the extent of its own power under
the enforcement clauses of those amendments. 59 He emphasized that

Congress can legislate under the amendments only "if the prohibition
(1946) (SEC authorized to regulate holding companies whose structure is "unduly or unnecessarily complex").
151. Industrial Union v. American Petroleum, 448 U.S. 607, 675-76 (1980) (Rehnquist,
J., concurring).
152. Id at 686.
153. "Congress shall have power ... to regulate Commerce with foreign nations, and
among the several states, and with Indian Tribes." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
154. L. TRIBE, supra note 65, § 5-4, at 235-36.
155. "[T]he Court asserts that regulation will be upheld if Congress had a rational basis
In my view, the
for finding that the regulated activity affects interstate commerce ....
[Ilt has long been established that the commerce power does
Court misstates the test ....
not reach activity which merely 'affects' interstate commerce. There must. . . be a showing
that regulated activity has a substantialeffect on that commerce." Hodel v. Virginia Surface
Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 311-12 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
156. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 2; amend. XIV, § 5; amend. XV, § 2.
157. 446 U.S. 156, 206 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
158. Id at 207.
159. Id at 220-21.
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is necessary to remedy prior constitutional violations by the governmental unit, or if necessary to effectively prevent purposeful discrimi'' 6o
nation by a governmental unit.
Justice Rehnquist as the Text
This section will examine Justice Rehnquist's record within the
context of three different theories of constitutional interpretation. First,
the orthodox theory will be reconsidered to see if it explains his record.
the strucThen, two alternative models will be described:
ture/substance model Justice Rehnquist purports to follow, and an individualism/paternalism model that he actually follows. These models
will be examined against the background of six factual propositions
derived from Justice Rehnquist's record. It will be argued that the second alternative model not only explains his record more convincingly,
but also reveals the social ideal that is at the core of his approach to
constitutional interpretation.
Reconsidering the Orthodox Theory
The orthodox theory of judicial review attempts to prevent judicial
creativity by requiring that the judge implement only values anchored
in the "intent" of the framers, as evidenced by the constitutional text,
its history, and structure.1 6 1 Reconsideration of the theory in light of
Justice Rehnquist's record reveals two inadequacies. First, the theory
fails to account for a large quantity of well-entrenched constitutional
doctrine. Second, it is unable to prevent judicial creativity even in
those areas in which we can discern the framers' intent.
The application of free speech rights to state legislation is one clear
example of the orthodox theory's failure to explain established doctrine. Justice Rehnquist concedes the applicability of free speech rights
to the states, 162 yet it has become fairly clear that the framers of the
fourteenth amendment had no such "intent."' 163 Some interpretivists,
like Judge Robert Bork, have attempted to expand the concept of "intent" to include free speech rights against a state. Judge Bork argues
that the structure of the Constitution sets up a political democracy and
that the concept of a political democracy implies a need for the free
160. Id. at 213.
161. See supra text accompanying notes 10-15.
162. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 291 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
163. R. BERGER, supra note 20. See supra text accompanying note 22.
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exchange of political ideas.' 64 But once we allow "structure" to play

this creative function, almost any political value can be similarly inferred from the structure, and the "intent" theory becomes an amor65
phous blob, incapable of justifying any result.'

The second weakness of the orthodox theory is the inevitability of
judicial creativity even in those areas where we are able to discern
some historical "intent" on the part of the framers. Assume that a
judge were able to solve the perhaps insurmountable historiographical

and epistemological problems of deciding which historical personages
count as the "framers" and how to identify a unitary "intent" from a
myriad of individual psychological states.' 6 6 The judge still would be
forced to choose between a narrow conception of the framers' intent
limited to concrete applications envisaged by the framers, and some

of their intent capable of application to unmore abstract conception
67
foreseen situations.'
If a judge chooses the concrete conception, the Constitution becomes a document of only antiquarian interest. This conception is in-

consistent with Justice Rehnquist's record, particularly in areas in
which he has taken an activist stance.' 68 Yet if a more abstract notion
of the intent is chosen, the interpretive task has just begun. First, the

judge must decide which of the various conceptions of intent advocated
should be chosen. Then that conception, along with other relevant con164. Bork, Neutral Princp1es and Some FirstAmendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 23
(1971).
165. The conservative Judge Bork is not the only theorist to rely on the "political" structure of the Constitution to justify his own preferred results; the liberal John Hart Ely uses
parallel reasoning to achieve more egalitarian results. See J. ELY, supra note 10, at 73-104.
Ely argues that the Court should go beyond values derived from the text to perform a
"representative-reinforcing" function. Id at 87. For instance, it is proper for the Court to
enforce free speech rights against the states because "they are critical to the functioning of
an open and effective democratic process." Id at 105. It is also permissible for the Court to
protect minorities from inequitable results of the majoritarian process when "existing
processes of representation seem inadequately tilted to the protection of minority interests..
" Id at 86. But as several commentators have shown, Ely's "representation-reinforcing" theory founders on the same positivist shoals as other interpretivist theories.
"Participation" as a political value is not granted any special status in the constitutional text;
therefore there is no more warrant for the Court to enforce "process" values than any other
extra-textual value. See, e.g., M. PERRY, supra note 11, at 77-86; Dworkin, The Forum of
Princivle, 56 N.Y.U. L. REv. 469 (1981); Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence ofProcess-Based
ConstitutionalTheories, 89 YALE L.J. 1063 (1980); Tushnet, Darkness on the Edge of Town:
The ContributionsofJohn Hart Ely to ConstitutionalLaw, 89 YALE L.J. 1037 (1980).
166. See Brest, The Misconceived Questfor the Original Understanding, 60 B.U.L. Rev.
204 (1980).
167. See Dworkin,supra note 165, at 488-97 (the framers had both abstract and concrete
intentions; even if they were discoverable it is impossible to discover which is dominant).
168. See supra notes 117-60 & accompanying text.
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stitutional principles, such as stare decisis and deference to legislative
judgment, must be applied to the case at hand. Text, history, and structure are of little help in these later stages.
Consider, for example, the case of Allied Structural Steel Co. v.
Spannaus169 in which Justice Rehnquist joined the majority in finding
a Minnesota pension reform law an unconstitutional "impairment" of
contractual obligation. 170 It is clear that the eighteenth century framers
had no specific intent on the twentieth century issue of pension reform.
But if a judge like Justice Rehnquist conceptualizes the framers' intent
at some more abstract level-perhaps the protection of certain "reliance" interests-several questions present themselves. Should the contract clause apply when the legislation adds supplementary duties to
the contract rather than merely annuls existing duties? To what extent,
if any, should the legislation's retrospective effect be considered? Is the
legislature's legitimate interest in regulating in the public interest constitutionally undermined by its choice of a narrow class of politically
unrepresented corporations to bear the burden of the reform? Should
the legislature's allegedly punitive purpose be constitutionally relevant
and how can that purpose be determined? Each of these questions can
be answered, but not by reference to the text, history, or structure of the
Constitution. In fact, the only way a judge like Justice Rehnquist could
divine the framers' intent in a case like Spannaus would be to assume
they were right-thinking people, people much like himself.
A parallel problem faced by Justice Rehnquist was giving contemporary content to the concept of equal protection in cases like Fullilove
v. Klutznick,17' in which he found "benign discrimination" in violation
of the due process clause of the fifth amendment. 7 2 First he had to
read the concept of equality into the fifth amendment, because the text
is silent. Then, because neither the framers of the fifth nor the fourteenth amendments had any "intent" regarding benign discrimination,
he was forced to choose one for them. Not surprisingly, his choice re73
flected certain substantive political values.'
In cases such as Spannaus and Fullilove, the text does not provide
the answers, so the judge must. The orthodox theory ignores this necessary creative element in constitutional interpretation. The "new"
169. 438 U.S. 234 (1978). See supra note 122 & accompanying text.
170. The law was found to violate the contract clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10. See
supra notes 120-22 & accompanying text.
171. 448 U.S. 448 (1980) (Stewart, J., dissenting). See supra note 139 & accompanying
text.
172. Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 448 U.S. at 522-32.
173. See infra notes 200-01 & accompanying text.
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hermeneutical theory of interpretation, on the other hand, has the creative element at its center.
The "new" theory of interpretation concedes that constitutional interpretation inevitably includes claims about social goals and values
that cannot be traced to the text.' 74 It argues that these claims in part
reflect normative theories of justice that are something ,more than a
description of facts; they are evocations of an ideal. The remainder of
this section seeks to discover the social ideal animating Justice Rehnquist's work as a judge. 175
Interpreting Justice Rehnquist
In order to construct a theory to explain Justice Rehnquist's record, six factual propositions summarizing his record are first set out.
Then two possible interpretations of his record are examined. Finally,
in the course of evaluating the second interpretation, or individualism/paternalism model, it is argued that this second model reveals the
social ideal upon which Justice Rehnquist's constitutional interpretation is based.
FactualPropositions
Justice Rehnquist's record can be summarized by the following six
76
propositions:'
I. Justice Rehnquist votes to narrow access to the federal
17 7
(Justiciability)
CoUrtS.
II. Justice Rehnquist votes to narrow the application of constitutional norms to private parties.' 7 8 (State Action)
III. Justice Rehnquist votes to narrow the protection of individual
rights in the Constitution, except as noted in Proposition IV. 179
(Individual Rights I)
174. See supra notes 30-37 & accompanying text.
175. My model is Roberto Unger's method of "common meaning" or "interpretive explanation" set out in LAW IN MODERN SOCIETY 246-52 (1976). See also C.B. MACPHERSON,
THE LIFE AND TIMES OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY 2-9 (1976); Kennedy, The StructureofBlackstone's Commentaries, 28 BUFFALO L. REv. 209, 211-21 (1979); Meltsner, Interpretive Construction in Substantive CriminalLaw, 33 STAN. L. REv. 591 (1981).
176. These propositions are not expected to be controversial. An early commentator on
Justice Rehnquist made similar conclusions about his voting patterns. Shapiro, Mr. Justice
Rehnquist: A PreliminaryView, 90 HARv. L. REv. 293 (1976). I do not mean, however, to
endorse Professor Shapiro's criticism of Justice Rehnquist's craftsmanship. See infra notes
248-60 & accompanying text.
177.

See supra notes 39-40 & accompanying text (standing).

178. See supra notes 41-50 & accompanying text (state action).
179. See supra notes 51-60 (procedural due process), 61-65 (substantive due process), 6685 (equal protection), 86-102 (free speech), 103-08 (establishment and free exercise clauses),
115-16 (cruel and unusual punishment) & accompanying text.
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Justice Rehnquist votes to expand the protection of individual
rights in three areas: the contracts clause,' 80 the takings
clause,' 8 1 and equal protection where the claimant has been

disadvantaged by an affirmative action plan.' 82 (Individual

Rights II)
V. Justice Rehnquist votes to expand state power relative to national power.' 83 (Federalism)
VI. Justice Rehnquist votes to enforce the separation of powers between the branches of the federal government.' 84 (Separation
of Powers)
The Structure/SubstanceModel

Justice Rehnquist has sketched one constitutional vision, which
might be referred to as the "structure/substance model," in his extrajudicial writings. 85 For Justice Rehnquist, the basic problem of government is finding a way for individuals with different moral and political views to live together in the absence of a method of determining
which view is correct.' 86 Democracy's solution to this problem is to
agree on a process of decision that grants each individual an equal
voice, even though it may not produce all the substantive decisions any
one individual might desire. This process, which "might loosely be
called 'majority rule,' "187 is the basic premise of our Constitution.
The framers of the Constitution selected a certain form of majority
rule, a form that places the majoritarian process within a structure that
provides for a division of power between the executive and legislative
branches of government, between the national and state governments,
and between the individual and either level of government:
180. See supra notes 120-22 & accompanying text (contract clause).
181. See supra notes 117-19 & accompanying text (takings clause).
182. See supra notes 138-40 & accompanying text (equal protection-affirmative action).
183. See supra notes 109-14 ("dormant" commerce clause), 123-28 (tenth amendment),
notes 129-37 (eleventh amendment), 153-55 (commerce power), 156-60 (enforcement clauses
of the Civil War amendments) & accompanying text. Justice Rehnquist's votes upholding
state legislation against claims of federal constitutional rights also support this proposition.
See supra text accompanying notes 39-116.
184. See supra notes 141-43 (appointments clause), 144 (executive privilege), 145-48
(legislative privilege), 149-52 (delegation of powers) & accompanying text. His votes against
claims of individual rights at odds with congressional legislation also support this proposition. E.g., Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981) (congressional decisionmaking regarding
defense given great deference).
185. See generally Rehnquist,supra note 5; Rehnquist, Government by Cliche, 45 Mo. L.
REv. 379 (1980).
186. "There is no conceivable way I can logically demonstrate to you that the judgments
of my conscience are superior to the judgment of your conscience, and vice versa." Rehnquist, supra note 5, at 704.
187. Rehnquist, supra note 185, at 384.

May/July 1983]

CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION

The Constitution that they drafted was intended to endure indefinitely, but the reason for this very well-founded hope was the general
language by which national authority was granted to Congress and
the Presidency. These two branches were to furnish the motor power
within the federal system, which was in turn to coexist with the state
governments; the elements of government having a popular constituency were looked to for the solution of the numerous and varied
problems that the future would bring. Limitations were indeed
placed upon both federal and state governments in the form of both a
division of powers and express protection for individual rights.
These limitations, however, were not themselves designed to solve
the problems of the future, but were instead designed to make certain
that the constituent branches, when they attempted to solve those
problems, should not transgress these fundamental limitations. 88
The role of the judiciary is to police the structure of government
set out in the Constitution to ensure that no branch or level of government exceeds its authority. The judiciary should not interfere with the
majoritarian process of decision-making on substantive issues, because
a substantive decision by the judiciary has no worth independent of the
values of the particular judges who made the decision. It is only success within the majoritarian process that can give substantive values
legitimacy.18 9
In many ways, this structure/substance model explains Justice
Rehnquist's record quite well. For instance, it is clearly consistent with
Propositions V (Federalism) and VI (Separation of Powers); his activism on these issues is easily reconciled with the model's premise that
one branch or level of government should not transgress into areas reserved to another. Congress should not usurp areas reserved to the
states nor undercut the autonomy necessary to the effective operation
of the executive branch. Proposition I (Justiciability) can also be seen
as an issue of structure, ensuring that the judiciary does not encroach
on areas of substantive decision-making reserved to the legislative
branches of national and state government. Proposition II (State Action), while not required by the model, is not inconsistent with it; a
charter for government and its norms should not be enforced against
private parties, unless the majoritarian process so chooses.
The structure/substance model is less successful in explaining
other aspects of Justice Rehnquist's record. While the model provides
for protection of individual rights, Justice Rehnquist gives expansive
protections to those rights covered by Proposition IV (Individual
Rights II), but reads individual rights narrowly in a host of other situa188.
189.

Rehnquist, supra note 5, at 699 (emphasis in original).
See supra note 14 & accompanying text.
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tions covered by Proposition III (Individual Rights I). If the judicial
branch is authorized only to police the structure of government in a
neutral manner, why are some individual rights expanded and others
contracted?
One also might question the structure/substance distinction itself.' 90 At first glance, Justice Rehnquist's narrow reading of most individual rights (Proposition III) seems appropriate because these appear
to involve questions of substance rather than structure. Yet, on closer
examination, many of these rights have excellent claims to "structure"
status. For instance, the issue of procedural due process involves the
"structural" protections required before a majority-approved norm can
be applied to an individual. So too, the right to vote clearly pertains to
the very structure of the democratic process. And similarly, a "structural" claim can be made for free speech rights in a democracy.' 9'
Conversely, many of the issues that the model denotes as structural can be viewed as substantive. Federalism (Proposition IV) is a
good example. While the issue of national versus state power has no
intrinsically necessary substantive impact, the framers of the Constitution realized that the size of the electorate might well have an effect on
the substance of their decisions. As James Madison put it, "the smaller
the number of individuals composing a majority, the smaller the compass within which they are placed, the more easily will they concert
their plans of oppression."'192 Alexander Hamilton also argued that the
national legislatures "will be less apt to be tainted by the spirit of faction."' 19 3 Contemporary observers confirm the fact that "the smaller
the population and geographic area, the greater the likelihood of dominance by a single political party or machine with a single set of mores
and the greater the opportunity for aggregation of economic power to
overshadow the political scene."' 194 Federalism can easily be viewed as
a question of substance rather than one of structure.
If an issue can be characterized as a matter of both structure and
substance, then the model provides little guidance to the judiciary as to
its proper stance in reviewing an issue. A judge who views free speech
rights as essentially a component of structure will be active in reviewing a free speech claim, whereas a judge who views these rights as an
For an analogous argument see Tribe, supra note 165, §§ 17-1 to -3.
See J. ELY, supra note 10, at 105-16; Bork, supra note 164, at 23.
THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 60-61 (J. Madison) (Modem Library 1937).
THE FEDERALIST No. 27, at 167 (A. Hamilton) (Modem Library 1937). See also G.
WILLS, EXPLAINING AMERICA 216-22 (1981) (extent of territory helps protect against spirit
of faction).
194. J. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS 252 (1980).
190.
191.
192.
193.
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issue of substance will be deferential to the other branches of
government.
A second problem with the model is its failure to explain the historical phenomenon of the political linking of particular structural and
substantive issues. For example, in American history, federalism has
usually been an "instrumental" value; one's view of federalism has
been linked to some larger substantive issue. The contrast between the
abolitionists' support of state power in the antebellum period and their
intellectual heirs' preference for federal control at first seems a paradox, 195 but the positions are easily reconciled. The abolitionists favored "states rights" when Congress protected slavery; after the
passage of the fourteenth amendment, it was the Southerners who argued that federalism should protect them from "imposition of a na196
tional norm upon local patterns of racial domination."
Since the 1930's, supporters of "states rights" have been united on
two substantive issues; they have opposed increased federal regulation
of the economy and federal pressure for racial equality. 197 This raises
the possibility that the structure/substance model's defense of state autonomy may be linked to some substantive value.
A third criticism of the structure/substance model focuses on the
controversial nature of its basic assumption: the majoritarian process
grants each individual an equal voice. Certainly this was not true at
the time the constitutional structure was set up: slaves, women, and
men without property were denied the vote. Furthermore, contemporary observers challenge the accuracy of the model's assumption today. 19 8 In fact, it is a truism that political influence correlates with
socio-economic status. 199 The poor are likely to be both apathetic
about politics and without the financial resources necessary to be effective. Conversely, the well-to-do are both active and able to muster the
financial and organizational resources necessary to "work" the system
effectively. This greater success of the well-to-do starts the cycle again,
195.
196.

See R. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED (1975).
Cover, The Origins ofJudcialActivism in the ProtectionofMinorties, 91 YALE L.J.

1287, 1304 n.54 (1982). See also Soifer, Book Review, 54 N.Y.U. L. REV. 651 (1979) (reviewing R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1977)).

197. See J. CHOPER, supra note 194, at 192 (explaining regional differences in racial
equality).

198. See Baker, Neutrality,Process,and Rationality: FlawedInterpretationsofEqualProtection, 58 TEx. L. REV. 1029 (1980); Parker, The Past of Constitutional Theory-And Its
Future, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 223 (1981).

199. See Parker, supra note 198, at 242-43.
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reinforcing the poor's apathy and rewarding the well-to-do with even
more hope and financial resources to wage the next political battle.
The substance/structure model is no more able to explain Justice
Rehnquist's decisions than was the traditional "intent" theory. This
leads to a suspicion that, despite his apolitical rhetoric, Justice Rehnquist does read the text in light of an unstated political vision. The next
section attempts to sketch the content of that vision.
The Individualism/PaternalismModel
Justice Rehnquist's extrajudicial writings give a clue to his conception of the majoritarian system of government. He does not claim that
each individual has an equal voice in the majoritarian process; he
claims only that each individual has an equal right or opportunity to
compete to have his or her views heard:
Representative government is predicated upon the idea that one who
feels deeply on a question as a matter of conscience will seek out
others of like view or will attempt to persuade others who do not
initially share that view. When adherents to the belief become sufficiently numerous, he will have the necessaryarmaments requiredin a
democratic society to press his views upon the elected representatives
of the people, and to have them embodied in positive law ...
The laws that emerge after a typicalpoliticalstruggle in which various
individual value judgments are debated likewise take on a form 2of°°
moral goodness because they have been enacted into positive law.
A social ideal that gives a central place to competition and to the
justice of rewarding the successful competitor could be the underlying
theme of Justice Rehnquist's work. The following is a sketch of such a
vision, which I term the acquisitive ethic or, alternatively, the individualism/paternalism model. 20 1 In this social vision, human beings are
perceived as self-interested maximizers of their own goals and ambitions. Not only is a person self-interested and acquisitive by nature, he
or she is also competitive. It is only through competition that an individual's goals are met because our collective appetites dwarf the finite
resources available to satisfy them.
200. Rehnquist, supra note 5, at 704-05 (emphasis added).
201. This section relies heavily on the following works: C.B. MACPHERSON, supra note
175; C.B. MACPHERSON, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF POSSESSIVE INDIVIDUALISM: HOBBES
TO LOCKE (1962); R. UNGER, LAW IN MODERN SOCIETY (1976); R. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE
AND POLITICS (1975); Dworkin, Liberalism, in PUBLIC AND PRIVATE MORALITY (S. Hampshire ed. 1978); Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L.
REV. 1685 (1976). See generally Gray, Eros, Civilization, and the Burger Court, 43 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROB. 71, 83 (1980); Heller, The Importanceof Normative Decision-Making, 1976

WIS. L. REV. 385, 481-85 (discussing liberal jurisprudence system in an historical context).
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The marketplace is the forum where this competition takes place.
It consists of voluntary exchanges between individuals, each making a
trade that improves his or her own position. To permit the market to
function, two conditions, historically identified with capitalism, must
prevail. First, each individual's property, including his or her own labor, must be alienable; second, there must be no limitations on the
right of individuals to accumulate property. Because talent and drive
are not evenly distributed throughout society, there will be winners and
losers, the rich and the poor, but this is justifiable because the rich have
succeeded as a result of their own virtue. Even the losers, because of
the wealth created by exchange, are better off than they would be without the competition of the marketplace.
The law provides the framework within which the competition of
the marketplace occurs. The law defines property, enforces contracts,
and remedies and deters violation of personal and property interests
through tort and criminal law.
The state is a double-edged sword. In one sense, the state is necessary in order to defend against foreign aggression, protect the security
of property, and provide the institutional framework in which voluntary transactions are possible. On the other hand, and especially as the
franchise is extended, the state can be viewed as a tool that the unsuccessful may use to expropriate the gains of the successful. The ignorant
majority, through the state, may also impede the creative power of the
market by imposing paternalistic restrictions on voluntary exchanges.
As to substance, law should favor individual autonomy over paternalism. For example, it should give as much free rein as possible to
individual creativity by restrictively defining the scope of obligation in
tort law, and by using narrow conceptions of causation and remedy. In
contract law, the legal system should view itself as a facilitator rather
than as a regulator of private exchanges and thereby allow the parties
to reap the benefits of their bargains without regard to seemingly unjust
results. Finally, law in all areas should eschew "paternalism" in favor
of fostering self-determination. There is no way to subsidize the loser
except to penalize the winner, an act which is both unjust and selfdefeating.
On the level of form, the individualistic ethic prefers general rules
to open-ended standards. General rules have the advantage of being
knowable in advance and therefore can be rationally considered by an
actor planning his or her activities. Open-ended standards-which
lead to injustice in the individual case because of their rigidity-have
little appeal to believers in the acquisitive ethic. A rule is knowable in
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advance, and, therefore, if someone finds himself or herself on the
wrong side of a rule, it is only because of stupidity or indolence. The
race truly is to the swift.
There is an interesting paradox surrounding the individualism/paternalism model's view of morality. On an abstract level, it is
outspokenly skeptical of value questions. Its belief in the tendency and
right of each individual to pursue his or her own subjective goals is the
psychological engine of the model itself. However, historically, the
model has been closely tied to a specific morality that is sometimes
termed the "Protestant work ethic." Capitalism requires a spirit of enterprise, asceticism, and willingness to defer gratification; this spirit is
threatened by a hedonistic morality. Restraints on hedonism are necessary in order to channel psychic and emotional energy into the production of wealth.
Individualism and paternalism replace structure and substance as
the ruling concepts in this model. The appropriate judicial strategy is
to take the constitutional stance that most frustrates paternalism and
most nurtures individualism. The model has a surprisingly strong
power to explain Justice Rehnquist's record.
The most striking instance of the model's accuracy is in its application to Proposition IV (Individual Rights II). The model specifically
dictates that the law protect property lawfully acquired, and ensure the
existence of a framework for contractual exchange. The other facet of2
20
Proposition IV, enforcing equal protection against affirmative action,
also squares with the model because the claimants in these cases are
victors in "merit" competitions whose victory has been snatched away
by a paternalistic state.
Proposition III (Individual Rights I) can also be explained by the
model once it is recognized that here a different type of individual right
is involved than in Proposition IV. The guiding principle behind the
20 3 and detractors 204
Warren Court's activism was, as both defenders
have pointed out, equality. To foster equality the Warren Court interpreted the fourteenth amendment as a paternalistic restraint on the
majoritarian process.
The judicial strategy of the Warren Court under the fourteenth
202.

See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 522-32 (1980); see also supra notes 138-40

& accompanying text.
203. See, e.g., J. ELY, supra note 10, at 73-75.
204. See, e.g., Kurland, Foreword.- Equal in Origin and Equal in Title to the Legislative
and Executive Branches of Government. 78 HARV. L. REV. 143, 144 (1964) ("First and fore-

most.

. . has

been the emerging primacy of equality as a guide to constitutional decision.").
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amendment is most easily discerned in decisions under the equal pro-

tection clause involving "suspect" classifications: race, alienage, sex,
and illegitimacy. 20 5 Yet equality is also a strong unarticulated theme in
the "fundamental right" branch of the equal protection doctrine. Successful "right to travel" challenges have involved plaintiffs unable to
afford the "basic necessities" of life;20 6 the major "right to marriage"
case invalidated a statute that had a disproportionate impact on the
poor;20 7 and the "right to vote" cases often involved requirements that

effectively barred minorities, the poor, or unpopular political groups
from the vote208 or the ballot. 20 9 Justice Rehnquist has consistently
210
urged a narrow interpretation of equal protection.

The theme of equality is also reflected in the Warren Court's procedural due process decisions.2 11 The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment may speak in terms of fairness rather than equality,
but the poor and powerless were its primary beneficiaries in the Warren
era.2 1 2 In fact, many of the landmark decisions in this area spoke
clearly of the need to bring the poor some semblance of equality before
the law. 21 3 Similarly, in civil settings, the Warren Court often invali2 14
dated state procedures that affected poor people.
205. See supra notes 69-70, 77-79 & accompanying text. The cases cited throughout this
section as "Warren Court cases" refer to cases decided while Chief Justice Warren sat on the
Court as well as to their progeny, that is, to those cases adopting the egalitarian philosophy
of the Warren years.
206. See, e.g., Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974); Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); see also L. TRIBE, supra note 65, § 16-48.
207. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
208. See, e.g., Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (poll tax).
209. See, e.g., Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972) (substantial filing fee requirement);
Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968) (rigorous requirements for new party to get on state
ballot).
210. See supra notes 66-85 & accompanying text.
211. See supra notes 51-60 & accompanying text.
212. It is a truism that not all classes of society are equally represented in the ranks of
criminal defendants, the group that benefited most directly from the Warren Court's interpretation of due process. See C. SILBERMAN, CRIMINAL VIOLENCE, CRIMINAL JUSTICE ch. 4
(1978).
213. "From the very beginning, our state and national constitutions have laid great emphasis on procedural and substantive safeguards to assure fair trials before impartial tribunals in which every defendant stands equal before the law. This noble ideal cannot be
realized if the poor man charged with crime has to face his accusers without a lawyer to
assist him." Gideon v. Wainright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963) (emphasis added). See also
Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
214. See, e.g., Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969) (wage garnishment).
In Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971), Justice Harlan gave the doctrine of due
process a novel twist when he interpreted it to prohibit the state from charging indigent
divorce plaintiffs a filing fee.
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Because the model opposes paternalistic intervention to further
equality, it suggests that Justice Rehnquist would oppose the Warren
Court's expansive reading of the due process clause in procedural settings. Indeed, Justice Rehnquist has consistently voted to restrict due
process protections. 21 5 A parallel point can be made about the free
speech cases. There is no shortage of speech in the United States; we
are inundated by speech. As Kenneth Karst has pointed out, the central issue in free speech has always been one of equality:2 1 6 whether
the majority may allow some messages while banning those from unpopular sources. 2 17 Justice Rehnquist's position in favor of allowing
the majority to regulate who may speak, 2 18 what they may say, 21 9 and
when they may say it220 also is consistent with the model.
The free exercise cases also frequently have benefited minority religions; 22 ' majority religions have usually been successful competitors
in the legislative arena. In fact, the Supreme Court interpreted the establishment clause as a barrier to prevent politically powerful religions
from reaping the full harvest of their legislative victories. 222 Justice
Rehnquist, on the other hand, has opposed the restrictions the Court
has placed on the government-that is, the politically successful-with
respect to the support of (establishment clause) or interference with
223
(free exercise clause) religion.
The "privacy" cases at first appear to be a counterexample. The
individualism/paternalism model fosters autonomy, yet Justice Rehnquist is hostile to claims of privacy made under the fourteenth amendment due process clause.22 4 The apparent inconsistency clears up,
however, if we distinguish between "privacy" claims to which the
majoritarian process is responsive, and those to which it is not. For
instance, to the extent "privacy" refers to quiet suburban retreats, shel215. See supra notes 51-60 & accompanying text.
216. See Karst, Equality as a Central Principlein the First Amendment, 43 U. CHI. L.
REV. 20 (1975).
217. See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503
(1969) (black armbands worn to protest Viet Nam war); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536
(1956) (civil rights leader urging picketing of segregated lunch counter); Feiner v. New
York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951) (individual making racially inflammatory speech on city street).
218. PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
219. Federal Communications Comm'n v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
220. Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455 (1980).
221. See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (Seventh Day Adventist discharged for refusing to work Saturday); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (Jehovah's Witnesses arrested for pamphleteering).
222. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
223. E.g., Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977).
224. See supra notes 63-65 & accompanying text.
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tered from the annoying aspects of contemporary life, there is no need
for judicial intervention because the majoritarian process protects this
type of privacy. The Warren Court privacy decisions protected another
type of privacy, the claim to freedom in personal choices that may offend the majority's moral sensibilities. 225 It is this paternalistic intervention, in furtherance of the values of equal concern and respect for
each individual, that Justice Rehnquist opposes.
Justice Rehnquist's voting pattern fits the model well even in those
areas where he concedes the applicability of a paternalistic constitutional norm. For instance, he admits that the state must intervene to
restrict racial classifications but puts the heavy burden of proving intent on the plaintiff.226 Once a violation is established, he again limits
the incursion by applying narrow conceptions of causation 227 and remedy. 228 The model would predict exactly this approach in the handling
of these constitutional torts; it favors a narrow definition of duty and
restrictive concepts of causation and remedy so as to foster autonomy.
Proposition II (State Action) easily fits the model. Justice Rehnquist has been the Burger Court's principal spokesman in a series of
cases severely limiting the "state action" concept, thereby limiting the
application of the fourteenth amendment's paternalistic standards to
the private sector. 229 This reflects a desire to limit paternalistic regulation of the free market. A parallel tendency to interpret paternalistic
legislation restrictively is seen in Justice Rehnquist's votes in cases in230
volving civil rights statutes.
Proposition I (Justiciability) also readily fits the model. In the
contract clause and takings clause cases, money damages are easily
demonstrated, so standing and other elements of justiciability are not a
225. See, e.g., Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (zoning ordinance
restricting particular family members from living together invalidated); Stanley v. Georgia,
394 U.S. 557 (1969) (statute prohibiting possession of obscene material in own home
invalidated).
226. City of Memphis v. Greene, 451 U.S. 100, 119 (198 1); City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446
U.S. 55, 62 (1980) (Stewart, J.). See supra note 83 & accompanying text. Cf. Personnel
Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 274-76 (1979) (sex discrimination).
227. See, e.g., Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526, 542-44 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 489-525 (1979) (Rehn-

quist, J., dissenting).
228.

E.g., Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424 (1976) (district court

may not mandate permanent racial mix by injunction).
229. See supra notes 41-50 & accompanying text; see also H. KALVEN, THE NEGRO AND
THE FIRST AMENDMENT ch. 7 (1967).

230. E.g., General Elec. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976); Furnco Constr. Co. v. Waters,
438 U.S. 567 (1978); International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
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bar to access to the federal courts. 23 1 It is only in the fourteenth
amendment cases where the injury claimed is intangible that justiciability becomes problematical. It is exactly those cases in which
Justice Rehnquist would deny access, 232 thereby limiting the fourteenth
amendment's paternalistic function.
The model also permits us to view Proposition V (Federalism)
from a new perspective. Justice Rehnquist prefers state to national
power. This mirrors the modern conservative dogma that rejects the
federal government's interference with "states rights" in its pursuit of
civil rights and social welfare goals. 233 Business interests have been
more successful in local forums than in the national arena,234 and the
local forum is exactly where Justice Rehnquist's federalism decisions
have sought to reallocate power. More important, the very structure of
federalism works against paternalism because a paternalistic value
must be implemented on a national scale to be effective; otherwise it
will be undermined by dissenting states. Even states that favor the paternalistic value may be forced to abandon it in a federal system in
order to attract businesses looking for an unregulated climate.
Proposition VI (Separation of Powers) also can be linked to the
model's values. The autonomy of the legislative and executive
branches works as a brake on the ability of the federal government to
regulate the states and the private marketplace. So too the "unlawful
delegation of legislative authority" doctrine, 235 which Justice Rehnquist favors, would make regulation by federal bureaucracies more difficult. By forcing Congress to create the regulatory programs it wants,
rather than allowing it to direct executive agencies to carry out this
function, the doctrine would increase the workload of Congress and
thereby discourage increased regulation.
A similar parallel between the model and Justice Rehnquist's decisions appears in the legal norms found in each. The model prefers
hard rules to open-ended standards because rules are knowable in advance and therefore foster and reward rational planning. Justice Rehn231. See supra notes 117-22 & accompanying text.
232. See supra text accompanying notes 39-40.
233. See supra text accompanying note 197: see also Cover, supra note 196, at 1307-09.
Justice Rehnquist would also make the state courts the primary judicial forum for enforcement of federal constitutional rights. See, e.g., Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327 (1977): Huffman
v. Pursue Ltd., 420 U.S. 592 (1975). An excellent survey of Justice Rehnquist's "procedural
federalism" is found in Powell, The Compleat Jeffersonian: Justice Rehnquist and Federalism, 91 YALE L.J. 1317, 1335-46 (1982).
234. See supra text accompanying notes 192-94.
235. See supra notes 149-52 & accompanying text.
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quist adopts a similar stance towards legal norms, arguing for a strict
"two-tier" theory of equal protection analysis rather than the more
flexible approach championed by Justice Marshall. 236 The model concedes that general rules have the drawback of permitting cases of individual injustice, but argues that the value of certainty outweighs this
disadvantage. Justice Rehnquist similarly tolerates the individual injustices generated by a system of rules: "[the legislator] strives for a
level of generality that is administratively practicable, with full appreciation that the included class has members whose needs may not be as
237
marked as those of isolated individuals outside the classification."
Justice Rehnquist's endorsement of the majoritarian process is also
given new meaning if we view politics as a competition between elites
in which the political consumer votes for the product he or she prefers.23 8 Hence, the political arena is also a marketplace that favors
those competitors with talent and resources. In fact, Justice Rehnquist's restrictive reading of right-to-vote cases even permits the majority to control who can compete, 239 who can vote, 240 and the weight of
24 1
each vote.
Still, a question remains. The model rejects paternalism, so one
would expect an adherent to vote to invalidate the host of paternalistic
legislation that comes before the Court each term. Yet Justice Rehnquist routinely votes to uphold paternalistic legislation that he may
himself abhor on substantive grounds.2 42 A series of partial replies is
required to address this apparent inconsistency. First, in some areas,
Justice Rehnquist has indeed invalidated paternalistic legislation
236. See Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 318 (1976) (Mardissenting); San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 72 (1973)
shall, J.,
(Marshall, J., dissenting).
237. Califano v. Boles, 443 U.S. 282, 284 (1979).
238. See Dworkin, supra note 201, at 177-92.
239. See, e.g., Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724 (1974) (White, J.) (statute limiting independent candidates' access to ballot positions upheld).
240. See, e.g., Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24 (1974) (upholding statute disenfranchising convicted felons).
241. See, e.g., Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist., 410 U.S. 719
(1973) (upholding voting right limitation for water district board to landowners, with votes
weighted according to land assessment value).
242. See, e.g., Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557,
583 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (state-created monopoly, with its inferior commercial
speech, should not have first amendment rights); PruneYard v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980)
(upholding broader first amendment protections granted by states); First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 822 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (voting to uphold state restriction
on corporate involvement in political campaigns).
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(Proposition IV).243 Second, as Justice Rehnquist himself has noted,
wholesale invalidation of social welfare legislation is no longer a politically viable option for a court. 244 More important, any attempt to reduce the political element in law to a simple reflection of a judge's
subjective preference is too simplistic an approach.2 45 There is no reason to doubt that judges on the whole adopt what H.L.A. Hart calls an
"internal perspective," which requires them to decide individual cases
as the "law" requires. 246 Still, consciously or, more likely, unconsciously, a judge must adopt certain ground rules. These rules in turn
reflect a certain inchoate social ideal and help create or maintain the
form of society that the ideal envisages.
In a paradoxical way, Justice Rehnquist's embrace of the
majoritarian process is doubly effective. It not only reinforces a process
that produces outcomes more benign than any other politically viable
process, but also legitimates the inequality that this process inevitably
produces. It performs this apologetic function by emphasizing each in247
dividual's formal equality.
Conclusion-The Future of Judicial Review
Summary of the Argument
While a detailed discussion of the legitimacy of judicial review is
beyond the scope of this Article, some sketch of the role a nonpositivist
theory envisages for courts in the future appears necessary. First, a
summary of the argument may prove helpful. I have argued that
1) there is an inevitable political element in constitutional adjudication
that cannot be escaped by reference to the constitutional text and
2) Justice Rehnquist's constitutional decisions reflect a certain social
vision that I term the "individualist ethic."
I do not attack the legitimacy of Justice Rehnquist's decisions or
the propriety of his methodology in reaching them. I certainly do not
claim that he deduces his conclusions from some set of ideological theorems. I claim only that Justice Rehnquist's decisions, like those of
Justice Brennan, reflect a social ideal not required by the constitutional
text. 248 This, of course, implicitly contradicts Justice Rehnquist's claim
243.
244.
245.

246.
247.
248.
eralism

See supra notes 121-22 & accompanying text.
See Rehnquist, supra note 5, at 704-06.
See Kennedy, supra note 175, at 209-20.
H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAw 86 (1961).
See Kennedy, supra note 175, at 217-18.
Of course, alternative interpretations are possible. Jeff Powell has argued that fedis the key to understanding Justice Rehnquist's decisions. See Powell. supra note
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that he plays a wholly apolitical role in judging. 24 9
Some readers may believe that I have unmasked the ideological

function of Justice Rehnquist's jurisprudence only at the cost of robbing judicial review of any claim to legitimacy. I hope the following
discussion shows that the emerging theory of interpretation does not
233. For instance, Powell argues that Justice Rehnquist's "negative attitude toward federal
protection of civil liberties flows quite naturally from Rehnquist's federalism and does not
necessarily stem from an antipathy toward civil and political rights in general." Id at 1344.
The best way to test this thesis would be to study Justice Rehnquist's civil liberties decisions
as a state court judge interpreting a state constitution; this is not possible. A less perfect, but
still instructive, technique is to look at Justice Rehnquist's record in cases involving civil
liberties claims against federal incursion; here the federalism issue is factored out. Justice
Rehnquist in fact has a clear record of voting against civil rights and liberties claims made
against the federal government. E.g, United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434 (1973) (bankruptcy filing fee does not deny indigents equal protection); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411
U.S. 677, 691 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (fifth amendment due process violation in
denial of benefits to spouses of servicewomen); United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548 (1973) (upholding prohibition on federal employees' participation in political management or campaigns); Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419
U.S. 498 (1975) (differentiating between male and female officers for discharge purposes is a
rational classification); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (due process does not require an evidentiary hearing prior to termination of disability payments); Greer v. Spock,
424 U.S. 828 (1976) (military regulations may prohibit distribution of political literature);
Hampton v. Mow Sung Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 117 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (requirement barring aliens from civil service employment violates due process); Matthews v. Diaz,
426 U.S. 67 (1976) (denial of Medicare to aliens residing in United States less than five years
does not violate the fifth amendment due process clause); Federal Communications Comm'n
v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (holding valid the F.C.C.'s power to regulate indecent broadcasting); Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280 (1980) (holding valid the Secretary of State's
revocation of a U.S. citizen's passport on grounds that the citizen's activities damaged national security); Brown v. Glinesi, 444 U.S. 348 (1980) (no first amendment violation in
requiring Air Force members to obtain approval before circulating petitions on Air Force
bases); Secretary of the Navy v. Huff, 444 U.S. 453 (1980) (upholding regulation requiring
military personnel to obtain approval before circulating petitions addressed to Congress);
Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981) (upholding requirement of possible military service
for males but not females); United States Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass'n,
453 U.S. 114 (1981) (non-delivery of unstamped letters does not abridge first amendment
rights); Federal Communications Comm'n v. WNCN Listeners Guild, 450 U.S. 582 (1981)
(policy of F.C.C. to promote diversity in radio broadcasts by licensing with regard to the
market upheld).
Where Justice Rehnquist has voted to uphold individual rights against the federal government, they have been "anti-egalitarian rights" covered by Proposition IV. E.g., Fullilove
v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (due process-affirmative action);
Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979) (takings clause); Buckley v. Valeo, 424
U.S. 1, 290 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (invalidation of
expenditure limits for candidates). It should be noted that inBuckley Justice Rehnquist also
dissented against the majority's upholding of funding procedures that Justice Rehnquist believed discriminated against minority parties in violation of the first and fifth amendments.
249. See supra notes 185-89 & accompanying text. I also believe that, stripped of its
legal trappings, Justice Rehnquist's social vision is a difficult one to defend on the level of
normative discourse.
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threaten the legitimacy of judicial review and actually can increase the
efficacy of public interest litigation.
Judicial Review, Expanded Doctrine, and Normative Discourse
It is true that we can no longer rest the case for judicial review on
the claim that judges find one "objective" answer inhering in the constitutional text. Yet this should not be especially surprising or alarming. With the possible exception of Justice Black, no Supreme Court
Justice in recent memory has made such a claim. The argument for
judicial review must be a "functional" one; 250 judicial review is an essential part of American democracy because it is a superior way of deciding certain controversial questions. For instance, we ask judges to
decide claims of individual rights against the majority because we feel
it unfair to allow the legislature, the representatives of the majority, to
be the judge of such disputes. 25' While there is no way to make the
discharge of such a task uncontroversial in a society divided on questions of political morality, it is not difficult to conclude that the relatively well-insulated judiciary has a better institutional claim of
competence to decide questions of individual rights than does the legislature, which is so sensitive to majoritarian prejudice.
The Court's openness to individual claims of injustice and its adherence to rules of rational argument can combine to create a unique
form of political decision-making, which Roberto Unger terms the regime of "expanded doctrine." 252 This model in many ways mirrors the
orthodox theory of judicial review. It requires judges to start their interpretive task with consideration of certain authoritative materials. It
also requires them to respect certain canons of acceptable argument,
the foremost of which is treating like cases alike. Judges are also required to accept some institutional restraints on their role. Finally, as a
practical matter, constitutional doctrine is regularly subjected to the
quite considerable majoritarian restraints of the appointments power.
Yet the regime of expanded doctrine departs from the orthodox
theory in important ways, some already presaged by actual constitutional practice. First, judges must concede, at least at the Supreme
Court level in "hard" cases, that the authoritative materials and adherence to accepted canons of arguments do not require any one decision;
there is a necessary indeterminacy that can only be resolved by refer250. See M. PERRY, supra note 11.
251. See R. DWORKIN, supra note 14, at 142.
252. Unger, The CriticalLegal Studies Movement, 96 HARV. L. REV. 563 (1983). I rely
heavily on Unger's article hi this section.
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ence to a political vision not required by the text or canons of argument. This concession has the initial advantage of candor; judges will
be forced to admit that any interpretation, activist or passivist, is a
political act, and will feel less constrained to torture both history and
precedent to reach their conclusions. I should emphasize that the theory does not permit judges to incorporate social philosophy wholesale
in their decisions. They must observe what Professor Ronald Dworkin
terms the "internal ideal" of law: treating like cases alike.2 53 Yet this
technical requirement itself becomes a catalyst for change as judges attempt the Herculean task of reconciling their remedy of injustice in one
area of law with arguably parallel injustices in other areas. 254 This concept of "internal development" is hardly revolutionary; the whole his255
tory of the equal protection clause since Brown v. BoardofEducation
illustrates its practice. Once practices that disadvantage racial minorities are declared unfair, the dynamic of precedent forces states to defend practices that disadvantage other minority classes, such as aliens,
women and illegitimates. The dynamic may be stopped or reversed on
the institutional level by political correction through the appointments
power, but on the level of normative discourse increasingly large areas
of the status quo are shown as vulnerable to claims of injustice.
Expanded doctrine "integrates into standard doctrinal argument
the explicit controversy over the right and feasible structure of society,
over what the relations among people should be like in the different
areas of social activity." 25 6 It is not that traditional doctrine does not
assume a certain proper structure of government and society; it does so,
but covertly, and the assumed structure is inimical to the claims of injustice. The regime of expanded doctrine makes the controversial nature of such assumptions explicit and forces them to be defended on the
normative level. Expanded doctrine portrays a society always in the
process of remaking itself, one in which no transitory structure is immune from the need to justify itself. The evolution of litigation from a
forum for the resolution of individual disputes to a more overtly polit2 57 Exical role illustrates the model's potential for institutional reform.
panded doctrine also has the advantage of openly tying law to politics.
Judges and lawyers will be forced to admit that they are engaging in a
253. See Dworkin, supra note 37.
254.

Denvir, Towards a PoliticalTheory ofPublic InterestLitigation, N.C. L. REv. 1133,

1147-48 (1976); Unger, supra note 252, at 602-16.
255.

347 U.S. 483 (1954).

256. See Unger, supra note 252, at 578.
257.

(1976).

See Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281
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form of political discourse in which they cannot claim infallibility nor
accuse others of incompetence because of ignorance of legal norms.
Three Problems
The Possibility of a "Right-Wing Ideological Coup"

Some may fear that conceding some indeterminacy in the constitutional text may allow a future conservative majority to interpret the
Constitution with a right-wing bias.
It is true that the new interpretation, as a matter of logic, is no less
hospitable to Justice Rehnquist's social vision than to Justice Brennan's. But then the orthodox theory's insistence on enforcing the framers' intent has not curbed Justice Rehnquist either. Also, the move
from the level of "intent" to normative discourse is one that favors the
interests of public interest clients. Once exploitative relationships are
cut off from the support of legal terminology, their vulnerability to rational argument increases. The distinction between de jure and de
facto race classifications illustrates a vulnerable social practice hiding
behind neutral legal terminology. I do not wish to claim that justice
will always emerge from the process of normative discourse; obviously
we all too often are able to convince ourselves that justice lies on the
side of our personal advantage. 258 However, I do believe a type of
discourse that accentuates the normative element helps public interest
clients more than one that ignores that dimension. Also, there is an
institutional tilt towards equality in the litigation process itself. A lawsuit creates the one forum in which government officials are forced to
account for their handling of a concrete instance of injustice to the
body pledged to uphold society's ideals. The tension between the abstract ideals that support the system and the concrete injustice creates a
strong impetus for remedial action so as to relieve the tension.
No theory of judicial review can prevent a conservative majority
from being appointed to the Supreme Court. In the long term a political culture's values will be reflected in its constitutional doctrine. But
even here the new theory seems preferable to the old since it expressly
points out that questions of constitutional law are always political in
the larger sense. A conservative majority's interpretation may be the
"law" in the limited sense that refers to practices enforced by the State,
but the new interpretation also emphasizes the importance of law in a
258. See Lawrence, Book Review, 35 STAN. L. REV. 101 (1983) (reviewing D. KIRP,
JUST SCHOOLS (1982)).
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larger sense, as an ongoing debate on political morality that can never
be terminated by a 5-4 decision.
The Spectre of Skepticism
Some may fear that the new theory's rejection of the distinction
between "fact" and "value" casts constitutional law into a sea of subjective opinion. While this objection is often raised, upon examination
it does not prove a serious problem. Skepticism can take two forms.
The "radical" form argues that no attempt at human reason can bring
us any closer to understanding the world or our place in it. While this
position is irrefutable, it is also irrelevant in constitutional debate
where each participant, whether liberal, conservative, or radical, believes that his or her "truth" has relevance to the problem of how to
structure government. 259 Therefore, skepticism normally appears in a
more genteel form, one which really is a form of negative normative
argument. One claims that since an opponent cannot prove his or her
position to be true in terms of the criteria of validity employed in the
natural sciences, it must be judged false. This tact simply misunderstands the structure of normative discourse where arguments can be
persuasive without being incontestable. The fact that normative discourse is always to some extent open-ended and has truth criteria less
rigorous than the natural sciences does not make it irrational. If it did,
the "genteel" skeptical argument would collapse into a "radical" one,
and we would all be condemned to silence.
The "Death" of Law
A more troubling objection argues that the concession of an irreducible normative element in constitutional interpretation will lead to
the gradual obliteration of the fragile line between law and politics in
the narrow electoral sense.2 60 If judges were not only perceived as, but
also perceived themselves as, the agents of a political party or ideological creed, it would destroy a distinctive part of the American form of
democracy. Yet there is nothing in the "new" interpretation that requires this result and nothing in the "old" that prevents it. In fact, I
believe that a candid role of judicial review in American democracy
serves the cause of judicial review better than a cynical "textual" apology that must increasingly ring hollow even in the ears of its speakers.
R. DWORKIN, supra note 14, at 279-90; Unger, supra note 252, at 648-54.
260. See P. NONET & P. SELZNiCK, LAW AND SOCIETY iN TRANSITION: TOWARD RESPONSIVE LAW, 115-19 (1978).
259.

